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CASE NOTES

RIGHT OF PRIVACY-MANDATORY HOSPITALIZATION
FOR ALL SECOND TRIMESTER ABORTIONS INVALIDATED AS NOT BEING REASONABLY RELATED TO MATERNAL HEALTH-City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
In Roe v. Wade,' the Supreme Court held that the right of privacy encompasses a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy.2
The Court, however, did not discuss whether a statute requiring
hospitalization for post-first trimester abortions would violate that
same right of privacy. In the absence of a definitive answer, state
courts have ruled inconsistently on this issue.' In City of Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health,4 the Supreme Court resolved conflicting state decisions and held unconstitutional a
mandatory hospitalization requirement for all abortions performed
subsequent to the first trimester.
© 1984 by Diana G. Lim.
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Id. at 153. In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has further defined the parameters of this fundamental right of privacy. See generally H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398
(1981) (holding that a statute that merely requires parental notice does not violate the constitutional rights of an immature, dependent minor); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (holding unconstitutional a statute requiring parental consent to an immature minor's decision to
obtain an abortion); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) (holding that the Social Security Act
does not require states to fund non-therapeutic abortions for indigent women); Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464 (1977) (holding that the equal protection clause does not require states participating in the Medicaid program to fund nontherapeutic abortions for indigent women, although states may elect to provide such funding); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (holding unconstitutional a provision of an abortion statute
requiring the prior written spousal consent of a woman seeking a first trimester abortion); Doe
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (holding a statute requiring hospitalization for all abortion
patients unconstitutional on the ground that the provision failed to exempt first trimester
abortions).
3. See Note, Hospitalization Requirements for Second Trimester Abortions: For the
Purpose of Health or Hinderance?, 71 GEO. L.J. 991, 995 nn.16-17 (1983). Seven provisions
pertaining to mandatory hospitalization for the second trimester have been held constitutional.
Three similar provisions have been held unconstitutional. The footnotes in the Note provide a
list of court decisions ruling on both the constitutionality and the unconstitutionality of second
trimester hospitalization requirements. Id.
4. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
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The city council of Akron, Ohio set forth seventeen provisions,
including the mandatory hospitalization requirement, in an ordinance entitled "Regulation of Abortions. '' " Violation of any provisions of the ordinance was punishable as a criminal misdemeanor.6
Five subsections of the ordinance were at issue before the
United States Supreme Court:
1)Section 1870.03 required all abortions after the first trimester
be performed in hospitals.7
2) Section 1870.05 required notice to be given to one of the parents or the legal guardian of an unmarried minor seeking an
abortion, as well as, parental consent to such an abortion.'
3) Section 1870.06(A) required the informed written consent of
the woman seeking an abortion. Section 1870.06(B) detailed the
information required to be given by the attending physician in
obtaining the consent of the woman seeking the abortion. Section 1870.06(C) required the attending physician to counsel the
woman seeking an abortion of the particular risks associated
with her own pregnancy. 9
5. AKRON, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES ch. 1870, §§ 1870.01-.19 (1979). Chapter
1870 provided extensive abortion regulations to be adhered to prior to, during, and following
an abortion. The full text of the Akron City Ordinance 160-1978 may be found in the appendix of Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172, 1208
(N.D. Ohio 1979).
6. AKRON, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES ch. 1870, § 1870.18 (1979). Section 1870.18
provided in pertinent part: "Whoever violates . . .this Chapter shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor of the first degree."
7. AKRON, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES ch. 1870, § 1870.03 (1979). Section 1870.03
provided: "No person shall perform or induce an abortion upon a pregnant woman subsequent
to the end of the first trimester of her pregnancy unless such abortion is performed in a
hospital."
8. AKRON, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES ch. 1870, § 1870.05 (1979). Section 1870.05
provided in pertinent part:
(A) No physician shall perform or induce an abortion upon an unmarried pregnant woman under the age of 18 years without first having given at least
twenty-four (24) hours actual notice to one of the parents or the legal guardian
of the minor . ...
(B) No physician shall perform or induce an abortion upon a minor pregnant
woman under the age of fifteen (15) years without first having obtained the
informed written consent of the minor pregnant woman in accordance with Section 1870.06 of the Chapter and
(1) First having obtained the informed written consent of one of her parents or her legal guardian . . . or
(2) The minor pregnant woman first having obtained an order from a court
having jurisdiction over her that the abortion be performed or induced.

Id.
9. AKRON, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES ch. 1870, § 1870.06 (1979). Section 1870.06
provided in pertinent part:
(A) An abortion otherwise permitted by law shall be performed or induced only
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4) Section 1870.07 required a twenty-four hour waiting period
between the time the consent is signed and the abortion is
performed."
5) Section 1870.16 required that the fetal remains of an aborted
fetus be disposed of in a "humane and sanitary manner."1 1

Shortly after the enactment of the ordinance, a lawsuit challenging
both the regulation in its entirety and specific provisions of the ordinance was initiated in the United States District Court. 12 The plaintiffs were three corporations which operated out-patient abortion
clinics in Akron and a physician who performed abortions at one of
the clinics. 3 The defendants were the City of Akron and three pubwith the informed written consent of the pregnant woman
given freely and
without coercion.
(B) In order to insure that the consent for an abortion is truly informed consent,
an abortion shall be performed . . only after she [has]
been informed as
follows:
(3) That the unborn child is a human life from the moment of conception
and that there has been described in detail the anatomical and physiological
characteristics of the particular unborn child or the gestational point of development at which time the abortion is to be performed, including, but not limited
to, appearance, mobility, tactile sensitivity, including pain, perception or response, brain and heart function, the presence of internal organs and the presence of external members.
(4) That her unborn child may be viable, and thus capable of surviving
outside of her womb, if more than twenty-two (22) weeks have elapsed from the
time of conception ....
(5) That abortion is a major surgical procedure, which can result in serious
complications, including hemorrhage, perforated uterus, infection, menstrual
disturbances, sterility and miscarriage and . . .that abortion may leave essentially unaffected or may worsen any existing psychological problems she may
have, and can result in severe emotional disturbances ....
(C) [T]he attending physician . . .shall . . .inform the pregnant woman . . .
of the particular risks associated with her own pregnancy and the abortion technique to be employed ....
Id.
10. AKRON, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES ch. 1870, § 1870.07 (1979). Section 1870.07
provided:
No physician shall perform or induce an abortion upon a pregnant woman until
twenty-four (24) hours have elapsed from the time the pregnant woman, and
one of her parents or her legal guardian whose consent is required in accordance with Section 1870.05(B) of the Chapter have signed the consent form
required by Section 1870.06 of this chapter. ...
id.
11. AKRON, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES ch. 1870, § 1870.16 (1979). Section 1870.16
provided: "Any physician who shall perform or induce an abortion upon a pregnant woman
shall insure that the remains of the unborn child are disposed of in a humane and sanitary
manner."
12. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 1172,
1181-82 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
13. Id. at 1181.
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lic officials."' Two individuals were granted leave to intervene
"solely in their capacity as parents of unmarried minor daughters of
childbearing age."'" The District Court invalidated sections 1870.05,
1870.06(B), 1870.16, and 1870.09.' The remainder of the ordinance
including section 1870.03, 1870.06(A), 1870.06(C), and 1870.07
were upheld as being constitutional."7
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in
part and reversed in part. 8 Finding that section 1870.03 (the hospitalization requirement) furthered the fundamental right of protecting
maternal health, the appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision of constitutionality. 9 The unconstitutionality of sections
1870.05 (parental notice and consent), 1870.06(B) (attending physician to inform the woman), and 1870.16 (disposal of fetal remains)
was also affirmed by the appellate court.20 The District Court's ruling on sections 1870.06(C) (warning of particular risks) and 1870.07
(twenty-four hour waiting period) was reversed as the appellate
court found these sections unconstitutional. 2'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari "in light of the importance of the issues presented, and in particular the conflicting decisions as to whether a state may require that all second trimester
abortions be performed in a hospital." 22 Reversing the district court,
the Supreme Court held sections 1870.03, 1870.06(B), 1870.06(C),
and 1870.07 of the Akron ordinance unconstitutional. The Supreme
Court affirmed the remainder of the District Court's decision on parental consent, informed consent, and the disposal of fetal remains as
being unconstitutional.
Justice Powell, in a six-three decision, reaffirmed the Court's
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1207. Section 1870.09 was not at issue before the Supreme Court. Section
1870.09 provided for the inspection of medical records and the physical facilities where abortions are performed. City of Akron, Ohio, Codified Ordinances ch. 1870, § 1870.09 (1979).
17. 479 F. Supp. 1172, 1207 (N.D. Ohio 1979). Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge
§§ 1870.02, 1870.03, 1870.04, 1870.11, 1870.12, 1870.13, and 1870.15 of Akron City Ordinance 160-1978 in the United States District Court (N.D. Ohio). Of the aforementioned provisions, §§ 1870.03 and 1870.06 of Akron City Ordinance 160-1978 were at issue before the
United States Supreme Court. Akron, 103 S. Ct. 2481.
18. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 651 F.2d 1198 (6th Cir.
1981). Except where the parties have specifically appealed the rulings, standing was not discussed by the court of appeals. Id.
19. Id. at 1208-10.
20. Id. at 1198.
21. Id.
22. 103 S.Ct. at 2481.
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earlier decision of Roe v. Wade 8 and held the hospitalization requirement unconstitutional. In Roe v. Wade the Court found "a
State's interest in health regulation becomes compelling at approximately the end of the first trimester. ' 24 At that point, the state may
"regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation
reasonably related to the preservation and protection of maternal
health."' 25 The Akron Court noted that Roe v. Wade required a state
"to make a reasonable effort to limit the effect of its regulations to
the period in the trimester during which its health interest will be
furthered. '2' Although the regulation may be reasonable for some
part of the second trimester, this alone would be insufficient to uphold the regulation.21
First, the Court reasoned that the hospitalization requirement
for all abortions performed during the second trimester would create
"a significant obstacle in the path of women seeking an abortion. 228
Such a regulation imposes the burden of additional medical expenses
on the woman. The Court noted that a second trimester abortion
performed in an abortion clinic using the Dilation-and-Evacuation
(D and E) procedure would cost one-half of what the same procedure would cost if performed in a hospital. 29 Additionally, a woman
unable to afford this added expense would be forced to travel to find
suitable abortion facilities. The necessity of traveling could further
burden an already limited budget, as well as jeopardize the health of
the woman. 30
Second, the majority reasoned that mandatory hospitalization
for all second trimester abortions did not increase a woman's safety
23. 410 U.S. 113.
24. 103 S. Ct. at 2495. See also Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. The "trimester" standard
originated in Roe. During the first trimester, the attending physician and the patient may
decide, free from unwarranted governmental regulation, whether to terminate the woman's
pregnancy. At approximately the end of the first trimester the state's interest in maternal
health becomes compelling and the state "may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent
that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health."
After viability of the fetus (the third trimester), the state may regulate and even proscribe
abortions to protect the potentiality of life, except when an abortion is necessary to preserve the
life or health of the mother. Id. at 163-64.
25. 410 U.S. at 163.
26. 103 S. Ct. at 2495.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. (citing Akron, 651 F.2d at 1209). Evidence was presented to show that a second
trimester abortion in a hospital would cost $850-900, while total charges for a D and E abortion performed in a clinic would be $350-400. Id.
30. 103 S. Ct. at 2495.

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

and, thus, was not a reasonable health regulation."' The Court cited
the American Public Health Association's current stance on the hospitalization requirement to show that second trimester abortions can
be performed in out-patient clinics without any detrimental effect to
maternal health."2 The Court ruled that Akron had "imposed a
heavy and unnecessary burden on a woman's access to. a relatively
inexpensive and safe abortion procedure." 3
The Akron court also held that the parental notification and
consent requirement was overbroad and unconstitutional. 34 Although
a state's interest in protecting pregnant minors will sustain a parental consent requirement, the state must still provide a means by
which the minor can prove either sufficient maturity or that the
abortion would be in her best interest. 5 The Akron ordinance in
question made a "blanket determination" 36 that all minors under the
age of fifteen were too immature to make the abortion decision and
that in no case would an abortion be in the minor's best interest.
The Akron court additionally reaffirmed its earlier holding in
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth37 that a state
may require a woman to give her free and informed consent prior to
having an abortion. However, the Supreme Court clarified the
meaning of informed consent by holding unconstitutional the provision requiring the state to relay certain specific information to a woman contemplating an abortion. 8 The Court reasoned that much of
the information was designed not to inform the woman, but to persuade her to withhold her consent altogether. 9 The Akron ordinance
was beyond the general subject matter relevant for informed
consent.

40

The Court further held unconstitutional a provision requiring
31. Id. at 2495-97.
32. Id. at 2496. "Current data shows that abortions occurring in the second trimester
can be safely performed by the D and E procedure . . . . Requirements that all abortions
after twelve weeks of gestation be performed in hospitals increase the expense and inconvenience to the woman without contributing to the safety of the procedure." Id. (citing Am. Pub.
Health Ass'n, Recommended Program Guidefor Abortion Services (Revised 1979), 70 AM. J.
PuB. HEALTH 652, 654 (1980)).
33. 103 S. Ct. at 2495.
34. Id. at 2499.
35. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979).
36. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 74 (1976). See also
Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2498.
37. 428 U.S. at 85.
38. 103 S. Ct. at 2500.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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the attending physician to perform the counseling/information giving
function.4 1 The ordinance was found to infringe upon the discretion
of the pregnant woman's physician as the physician would be restricted in exercising his judgment in his patient's best interest.4 2
The Court was also concerned that such an ordinance might impose
an added and needless expense to the abortion procedure. Absent a
specific request, there is no vital state need accomplished by a physician performing the counseling.' Further, the decision provided that
a state may also establish reasonable minimum qualifications for
those people who perform the primary counseling function.""
The majority also held unconstitutional the requirement of a
waiting period between the time the consent is signed and the time
the abortion is performed. Akron failed to demonstrate any legitimate state interest in requiring a twenty-four hour waiting period.
Since evidence was lacking to show that safety would be increased,
the waiting period was determined to be "arbitrary and inflexible.""'
The Court also held unconstitutional the provision requiring physicians performing abortions to assure the humane and sanitary disposal of fetal remains.' 6 The Court reasoned that "humane and sanitary" suggested a possible intent "to manifest some sort of decent
burial." The Court concluded that such "uncertainty is fatal where
criminal liability" is involved.' 7
The dissent, authored by Justice O'Connor and joined by Justices White and Rehnquist, found the majority's analysis of the Akron regulation "inconsistent both with the method of analysis employed in previous cases dealing with abortion and with the Court's
approach to fundamental rights in other areas.' 4 8 The dissenters argued that the Court applied the wrong standard by using a "compelling state interest" test rather than an "unduly burdensome" test. 9
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 195.
45. 103 S. Ct. 2503.
46. Id. at 2504. But see id. at 2504 n.45. The footnote implies that § 1870.16 of Akron
City Ordinance 160-1978 would have been held valid if "humane" could have been severed
from "humane and sanitary" disposal of fetal remains. Since the Court was unsure whether
Akron would have enacted the statute absent the "humane" restriction, § 1870.16 in its entirety was invalidated.
47. Id. See also Akron, 651 F.2d at 1211.
48. 103 S. Ct. at 2504.
49. Id. at 2505 quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473 (1977); Bellotti v. Baird, 428
U.S. 132, 147 (1976) (Bellotti I)). The majority equates the minority's "unduly burdensome"
test with the rational basis test. In a footnote the Court stated:
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Citing Maher v. Roe,50 the minority asserted that a regulation imposed on "a lawful abortion 'is not unconstitutional unless it unduly
burdens the right to seek an abortion.' " The dissent further explained that the Constitution does not empower the Court to "strike
down laws because they do not meet our standards of desirable social
policy, 'wisdom,' or 'common sense.'"2
The dissent reevaluated past decisions and found the trimester
approach set forth in Roe v. Wade to be "a completely unworkable
method of accommodating the conflicting personal rights and compelling state interests that are involved in the abortion context."S
While the majority adhered to the trimester approach of Roe v.
Wade the dissent found that "the lines drawn . . . [in Roe] have

now been 'blurred.' " Justice O'Connor explained that a state may
no longer rely on the boundaries established in Roe v. Wade "that
separate the permissible from impermissible ....

-'5 The majority's

decision requires the state to "continuously and conscientiously
study"" current medical data to determine whether the regulation
would "depart from accepted medical practices." 57 The dissent further maintained that the Constitution cannot require the state to perform such an "exacting task58

. . .

as a prelude to protecting the

citizens." ' 9

health of their
The Supreme Court, in invalidating the second trimester hospitalization requirement, reached the only conclusion that can be justified in light of Roe v. Wade and its progeny. As set forth by the
landmark decision of Roe v. Wade, the right of privacy is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision to terminate her pregIn sum, it appears that the dissent would uphold virtually any abortion regulation under a rational basis test. It also appears that even where heightened scrutiny is deemed appropriate, the dissent would uphold virtually any abortioninhibiting regulation because of the state's interest in preserving potential
human life ....
This analysis is wholly incompatible with the existence of the
fundamental right recognized in Roe v. Wade.
Akron, 103 S. Ct. 2487 n.l.

50.

432 U.S. 464.

51. 103 S. Ct. at 2505.
52. Id. at 2505 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 242 (1982)) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2506.
55. Id.

56. d.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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nancy. 60 A woman's choice to terminate her pregnancy is not, however, "unqualified"'" and must be balanced against important state
inteiests. The state has a separate and distinct interest in protecting
the potentiality of human life, as well as, preserving and protecting
the health of the pregnant woman. At some point, each of the two
interests will become compelling.6"
The Court in Roe v. Wade stressed that in light of the "present
medical knowledge,"' ' 3 the point at which the state's health interest
in the pregnant woman becomes compelling is at "approximately the
end of the first trimester."6' 4 The Court set this point as "compelling"6 5 because until the end of the first trimester, child birth would
result in mortality with greater frequency than abortion.66 Because
the fundamental right of privacy is also at stake, the state regulation
is subject to heightened scrutiny. When the state's interest becomes
compelling, a state's regulation of abortion must "reasonably relate
to the preservation and protection of maternal health."6 7
Doe v. Bolton,6 8 the companion case of Roe v. Wade, further
refined the test the Court must apply in deciding the constitutionality
of the hospitalization requirement. In Doe, the state required that all
abortions be performed in hospitals, regardless of the stage of pregnancy. The Doe Court held that the state had "not presented persuasive data to show that only hospitals . . . insur[e] the quality of the
operation and the full protection of the patient."69 The hospitalization requirement at issue in Doe was invalidated because the statute
70
failed to/exclude the first trimester.
The ruling concerning hospitalization in Akron was consistent
with the findings of Roe v. Wade and Doe. To meet the test set forth
in Roe, the City of Akron had to prove that the hospitalization ordinance was a reasonable health regulation which would preserve and
protect the health of the woman. The City of Akron failed to meet
this burden. Hospitalization during the early part of the second trimester neither serves to protect nor preserve the health of the pa60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

410 U.S. at 153.
Id. at 154.
Id. at 162-63.
Id. at 163.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
410 U.S. 179 (1973).
Id. at 195.
Id. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163.
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tient." The evidence failed to show that hospitalization increased the
safety to women for abortions performed during the early part of the
second trimester. 2
According to Doe, however, proving the reasonableness of the
ordinance in the protection of maternal health was not enough. Akron had to provide persuasive evidence showing that only hospitals
can insure the quality of the procedure and the protection of the
patient. Akron failed in this capacity also. Abortions performed in
clinics during the early part of the second trimester exposes the patient to no greater danger than if the procedure were performed in a
hospital.7
The trimester approach enunciated by Roe v. Wade was to remain flexible in accordance with the existing medical knowledge."
Current medical knowledge, if measured as in Roe, makes abortion
during the early part of the second trimester safer than bearing a
child. This current medical knowledge would "flex" the first trimester into a longer duration, as the Court in Akron concluded.7 5 By
extending the first trimester, the Court appeared to take the policy
stance of further restricting the state's ability to regulate abortion.
The states must now wait longer before their compelling interest to
regulate for the protection of maternal health appears.
The Akron decision was also consistent with the Court's reasoning in Danforth.7 In Danforth, the Court invalidated a statute
prohibiting second trimester abortions by the saline amnioscentesis
method. 7 Saline amnioscentesis, which was readily available, was
the most popular method for abortions during the second trimester.
Prostalandin was an alternative method, but the unavailability of
prostalandin had the effect of substantially banning all second trimester abortions.7 The Danforth Court ruled that an alternative
71. 103 S. Ct. at 2495-96.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2496.
74. 410 U.S. at 163.
75. 103 S. Ct. at 2496. If this were true, a state's interest would not become compelling
until having an abortion would become riskier than carrying a child to term. At some point in
the future, the time at which the fetus is viable will intersect with the time when it will be
safer to have an abortion than to carry the child to term. The Court, at that time, will need to
decide which is more "compelling." Thus far, the Court has not dealt with the issue in which
the woman's health must be weighed directly against the viable fetus.
76. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
77. Labor is induced by an interuterine instillation of saline solution in a saline amnioscentesis abortion.
78. 428 U.S. at 79. In the prostaglandin method of abortion, labor is induced by an
intra-amniotic injection of prostaglandin.
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method must be available and that the alternative method must be as
safe as the method outlawed.
Thus, in addition to the criteria espoused by Roe v. Wade and
Doe, Danforth established a more stringent test by requiring the
Court to consider both the availability of an alternative method and
79
a safety comparison of the banned method with the alternative.
The Akron requirement of hospitalization for second trimester abortions was as safe as the alternative of clinically-performed abortions.80 This alone was insufficient to hold section 1870.03 as reasonably related to maternal health. In the case at hand, a lower court
found that second trimester abortions were "rarely" 8 1 performed in
Akron hospitals. A woman might be forced to travel to find adequate
abortion facilities at an added expense and threat to her health."2
The Court was left with no option but to invalidate the Akron
ordinance.
Not only is Akron consistent with prior cases, it also refined the
criteria to be used by the courts in determining whether a statute or
ordinance does in fact reasonably relate to maternal health. The expense of hospitalization played a prominent factor in the invalidation
of the ordinance.8 3 The Court noted that a hospital-performed abortion was more costly than one clinically-performed, without any increased safety benefits to the woman. The added expenses of hospital
facilities would create a "significant obstacle" 4 to a woman terminating her pregnancy. Thus, where such a requirement is present it
will be held unconstitutional as an unreasonable health regulation.
Further, under Akron a court may invalidate an abortion regulation if the ordinance departs from the "accepted medical practice"
for a "substantial portion of the second trimester."85 The accepted
medical practice, at present, is to perform early second trimester
abortions in clinics. As such, section 1870.03 had to be invalidated as
it departed from accepted standards for a "substantial portion of the
second trimester." '8
The Court has, however, left undetermined the definition of a
"substantial portion of the second trimester."8 " The states must as79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

428 U.S. at 52.
103 S. Ct. at 2496.
103 S. Ct. at 2495.
Id.
Id. See also Akron, 651 F.2d at 1209.
103 S. Ct. at 2495.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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certain what constitutes a "substantial portion of the second trimester" when evaluating whether a regulation departs from accepted
medical practices. It is likely that the various states will define this
phrase differently, thus presenting problems of inconsistency. If the
inconsistencies are too pervasive, the Court may find itself granting
certiorari to clarify Akron.
Another open question is presented by the dissent in Akron.
Roe v. Wade permitted hospitalization for abortions performed in
the third trimester because a state may "regulate and even proscribe
abortions" except where the woman's life or health is endangered.8 8
The dissent noted that the "bright lines" 9 drawn in Roe have been
"blurred" due to technological advances in abortion procedure.9" If
the demarcation of what constitutes the second trimester and the
third trimester are "blurred," then it is unclear at what point the
state must cease to regulate the abortion procedure as reasonably related to maternal health and at what point the state may proscribe
abortions. If the boundaries of each trimester are no longer clear,
Roe and its progeny may be found "unworkable." 9
Further, had the majority adopted the dissent's approach and
applied the "unduly burdensome"" test, the Court would still have
concluded that the Akron ordinance was unconstitutional. In the
9
cases cited by the dissent, Maher v. Roe" and Harris v. McRae, "
the Supreme Court found that the challenged statute "places no governmental obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses to terminate
her pregnancy."' Because no obstacles were presented, the statutes
were not found to unduly burden the woman's choice. In the case at
hand, the majority ruled that the hospitalization requirement created
"a significant obstacle" ' in the path of a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy. Such "a significant obstacle" would surely unduly burden a woman's decision. Thus, the hospitalization provision
of the Akron ordinance would have been invalidated as unduly
burdensome.
Also of significance in Akron is the Court's invalidation of the
provision requiring the attending physician to counsel the pregnant
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

410 U.S. at 164-65.
103 S. Ct. at 2506 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

Id.
Id. at 2505 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id.
432 U.S. 464 (1977).
448 U.S. 297 (1980).
Id. at 315.
103 S. Ct. at 2495.
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woman considering an abortion, sections 1870.06(B) and (C). The
Court in dicta, however, asserted that although a state may not require physician counseling, it may require the attending physician to
"[verify] that adequate counseling has been provided and that the
woman's consent is informed." 97 It is unclear whether the state
would retain the discretion to determine how a physician would verify the patient's informed consent. If such is the case, the state could
place such stringent requirements upon physicians conducting the
patient verification as to result in counseling by the physician.
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health adhered to the analysis of past decisions. Further, Akron suggested that
the ability of states to restrict abortions in the future will be made
more difficult since the Court will strictly apply the compelling state
interest test in deciding the validity of the regulation. Also, the cost
of the abortion procedure and whether the statute would result in
the departure from accepted medical standards for a substantial portion of the second trimester are new factors which a court can consider in judging a statute's validity.
Diana G. Lim

97.

Id. at 2502.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSEPRACTICE OF FORMAL DAILY LEGISLATIVE PRAYER
IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGIONMarsh v. Chambers, 103 S.Ct. 3330 (1983).
Since 1855, the State of Nebraska has engaged in the practice of
opening legislative sessions with prayer.' The prayer is offered by a
chaplain who is chosen biennially by the Executive Board of the
Legislative Council and paid out of public funds.2 Since 1965, a
Presbyterian minister has been the Nebraska Legislature's only
chaplain with a salary of $319.75 per month for each month the
legislature is in session. The content of the prayers offered by the
chaplain has been based for the most part in the Judeo-Christian
tradition. Plaintiff, a member of the Nebraska Legislature and a Nebraska taxpayer, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. sections 1983,
seeking to enjoin the practice.' Plaintiff alleged that the practice of
opening each legislative session with a prayer violated the Establishment Clause of the first amendment to the Constitution.' The district
court, "after denying a motion to dismiss on the grounds of legisla© 1984 by Wendy Linn Ross.
1. Marsh v. Chambers,
-. U.S.-. 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3332 (1983) (citing Nebraska
Journal of the Council at the First Regular Session of the General Assembly 16 (Jan. 22,
1855) and Rules of the Nebraska Unicameral, Rules 1, 2, and 21).
2. Id. The prayers are recorded in the Legislative Journal and occasionally collected
into prayerbooks which are published at the public expense. Id. at 3332 n.1.
3. Chambers v. Marsh, 504 F. Supp. 585 (D. Neb. 1980), affd in part and rev'd in
part, 675 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1982), 103 S.Ct. 3330 (1983). 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
Named defendants were Frank Marsh, State Treasurer; Robert E. Palmer, Chaplain;
and all members of the Executive Board of the Legislative Council in their official capacity.
Chambers v. Marsh, 504 F.Supp. at 586.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl.1.The Establishment Clause was included in the Bill of
Rights to ensure that the federal government would remain separate from established religious
doctrines, institutions, and practices in the United States. The full text of the religion clauses
reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof.
...
The first amendment has been applied to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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tive immunity ... held that the Establishment Clause was not
breached by the prayers, but was violated by paying the chaplain
from public funds."' Cross appeals were taken to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.' The circuit court held that the practice
of legislative prayer as well as the Chaplain's remuneration from
public funds violated the provisions of the Establishment Clause.
The court of appeals, therefore, modified the district court's injunction and prohibited the state from continuing the practice of opening
legislative sessions with prayer. The United States Supreme Court
granted the petition for writ of certiorari8 and reversed the decision
of the court of appeal. 9
The Supreme Court held that Nebraska's statute authorizing
the practice of legislative prayer and the payment of the chaplain out
of public funds did not violate the Establishment Clause of the first
amendment to the Constitution.1 The Court based its opinion
largely on the historical background of legislative prayer in this
country and the drafting of the first amendment. The Court also relied upon the tradition followed by Congress and various state legislatures of beginning sessions with an invocation." The Court commented that "[tihe opening of sessions of legislative and other
deliberative public bodies with prayer is deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country." 2 The Court also placed much
emphasis on the fact that the practice of opening sessions with
prayer was established as one of the first priorities of the first Congress at virtually the same time the drafters of the Bill of Rights
were reaching a consensus as to the wording of the first amendment. 8 The Court viewed the fact that the practice of opening sessions with prayer has continued uninterrupted since the early sessions of Congress as evidence that the framers of the Establishment
5. Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. at 3332. The district court therefore enjoined the
legislature from using public funds to pay the chaplain, but upheld the legislature's practice of
beginning sessions with prayer. The lower court also enjoined the state's practice of publishing
prayers at public expense. Chambers v. Marsh, 504 F.Supp. at 585.
6. Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983).
Plaintiff Chambers appealed the holding that legislative prayer did not violate the Establishment Clause, and the defendants appealed the injunctions prohibiting payment to Reverend
Palmer out of public funds and the printing of the prayerbooks at public expense. Id.
7. Id.
8. Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1982).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 3335.
11. Id. at 3332-33.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 3333.
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Clause did not consider paid legislative chaplains and opening
prayers violations of the clause."'
The Court found unpersuasive the respondents' argument that
historical practices are irrelevant due to the vast differences between
today's heterogeneous society and the society of the framers. 5 As
proof of the weakness of the historical argument, respondents also
cited John Jay's and John Rutledge's opposition to the motion to
begin the first session of the Continental Congress with prayer."
The Court viewed this evidence in the opposite manner, noting that
"indeed it infuses [the historical argument] with power by demonstrating that the subject was considered carefully and the action not
taken thoughtlessly, by force of long tradition and without regard to
the problems posed by a pluralistic society.'

7

After concluding that history and tradition were sufficient to
uphold the practice of legislative prayer, the Court next considered
whether any specific features of the Nebraska practice violated the
Establishment Clause. Aside from the fact that a prayer was said,
plaintiff alleged three points that breach the provisions of the Establishment Clause: first, the chaplain is paid at public expense; second,
the same chaplain has been retained for the past sixteen years; and
third, the prayers offered are in the Judeo-Christian tradition.'
The Court found these factors to be insignificant when weighed
against the historical background of the Establishment Clause and
legislative prayer." The Court justified the payment of the chaplain
out of public funds on historical grounds, explaining that both the
United States Congress and the Nebraska Legislature had a long
tradition of reimbursing legislative chaplains out of public funds.
The chaplain's sixteen-year long tenure indicated to the Court that
the chaplain was reappointed because the Nebraska Legislature was
satisfied with his performance and personal qualities."0 The Court
then concluded that, absent evidence of an impermissible motive on
the part of the legislature, the sixteen-year tenure of the legislative
chaplain does not by itself conflict with Establishment Clause provisions. 2 ' The Court summarily dismissed any alleged violations due to
14. Id. at 3334.
15. Id. at 3335 (citing Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Abington School District
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237 (1963)).
16. Brief for Respondent at 60, Marsh v. Chanbers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983).
17. Id. at 3335.
18. Id. at 3336.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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the limited content of the prayers. Chief Justice Berger, writing for
the majority, noted:
[T]he content of the prayer is not of concern to judges where, as
here, there is no indication that the prayer opportunity has been
exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any
other, faith or belief. That being so, it is not for us to embark
evaluation or to parse the content of a particular
on a sensitive
22
prayer.

Justice Brennan's dissent, in which Justice Marshall joined,
was a comprehensive critique of the majority's conclusions and reasoning. 8 The dissent immediately noted that the historical and traditional arguments on which the majority opinion was based failed to
take into consideration any of the tests developed by the Supreme
Court in previous Establishment Clause cases. 2 ' Justice Brennan
viewed this failure to apply prior precedent favorably, however, because "it simply confirms that the Court is carving out an exception
to the Establishment Clause rather than reshaping Establishment
Clause doctrine to accommodate legislative prayer."28 Justice Brennan applied the three-part test the Court developed in Establishment
Clause conflicts and found that Nebraska's practice of opening legislative sessions with a religious invocation violated each prong. 6
Brennan viewed the purpose of legislative prayer as "preeminently religious," 7 noting that " '[t]o invoke Divine guidance on a
public body entrusted with making the laws' . . . is nothing but a

religious act." 2 Justice Brennan found the primary effect of legislative prayer to be clearly religious due to the link between religious
29
belief and observance and the state's political power and prestige.
Finally, Justice Brennan concluded that the necessity of choosing a
suitable chaplain and ensuring that the prayers offered are appropriate is, in itself, excessive government entanglement. Justice Brennan
22. Id. at 3337.
23. Id. (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting). Justice Brennan's dissent is more than
twice as long as the majority opinion.
24. Id. at 3338.
25. Id.
26. Id. The three-prong test set forth in a prior Establishment Clause case is as follows:
(I) the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; (2) its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13
(1971).
27. Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. at 3338.
28. Id. (quoting the majority opinion).
29. Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. at 3339.
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emphasized that excessive entanglement also arises when controversy
over a subject like the one before the Court divides the legislature on
issues of religion and religious conformity.8"
Justice Brennan noted that the Establishment Clause requires
the government to remain neutral with respect to various religious
theories, doctrines, and practices, and also to maintain a neutral position between religion and non-religion. 3 Brennan found legislative
prayer to be a clear violation of the neutrality principle required by
the Establishment Clause. 2 Brennan distinguished the practice of
legislative prayer from other practices which the Court has upheld as
not violating the Establishment Clause. Government acts which
merely coincide or conflict with a particular religion are not, for that
reason alone, considered an establishment of religion.33 However,
30. Id. Justice Brennan acknowledges the appeal of the historical argument that the
majority uses to sustain the practice of legislative prayer. Nevertheless, he sets out three reasons why history should not sustain the practice of legislative prayer in the face of violation of
the three-prong test. Brennan first points out the weakness of the inference that the framers,
by voting for congressional chaplains three days before they reached agreement on the final
language of the Bill of Rights, did not believe the practice violated the Establishment Clause.
In their role as legislators, the framers may have overlooked the constitutional ramifications of
their actions. Brennan next noted the fict that the Bill of Rights became the supreme law of
the land due to the ratification of the states, and thus the Court should consider the states'
intent, as well as that of Congress, in any Bill of Rights question. justice Brennan's most
important point is his last. The Constitution is the supreme law today because it has remained
open to changing interpretation resulting from the changing face of American society. The
intent and experiences of the framers cannot be used exclusively to determine the document's
meaning. Id. at 3347-48.
31. Id. at 3341. The purposes of this neutral stance are many, but Justice Brennan
finds four that are particularly relevant in this instance. First, neutrality serves to guarantee
the individual right to conscience. Second, neutrality safeguards the autonomy of religious life
from any undue interference from state involvement in the supervision of religious institutions
or officials or to state decision-making with respect to religious issues. Third, a neutral role
prevents the trivialization of religion by keeping a distance between religious and political
bodies. Fourth, neutrality aids in ensuring that religious issues do not create conflict within the
religious arena. Id. at 3341-42.
32. Id. at 3344.
It intrudes on the right to conscience by forcing some legislators either to
participate in a "prayer opportunity" . . . with which they are in basic disagreement, or to make their disagreement a matter of public comment by declining to participate . . . . It requires the State to commit itself on fundamental
theological issues. It has the potential for degrading religion by allowing a religious call to worship to be intermeshed with a secular call to order. And it
injects religion into the political sphere by creating the potential that each and
every selection of a chaplain, or consideration of a particular prayer, or even
reconsideration of the practice itself, will provoke a political battle along religious lines and ultimately alienate some religiously identified group of citizens.

Id.
33. Id. at 3345 (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday laws);
Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (abortion restriction)).
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Justice Brennan viewed legislative prayer not as conduct which is
compatible with some or all religions, but as something "fundamentally and necessarily religious." 34 Furthermore, Justice Brennan
noted that the Establishment Clause does not forbid recognition of
American society's religious beliefs and practices as an aspect of our
history and culture. Justice Brennan argued that legislative prayer
goes beyond a tolerable acknowledgment of religion and becomes an
act of religion itself.38
Justice Stevens submitted a brief dissent as well. 6 His opinion
contended that the election of "a member of one religious faith to
serve as sole official chaplain of a state legislature for a period of
[sixteen] years constitutes the preference of one faith over another in
violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment."3 "
Justice Stevens based this contention on his belief that due to the
democratic nature of the election process, the chaplain's religious
tenet may reflect the faith of the lawmakers' constituents rather than
that of the lawmakers themselves. 8 The pressure a legislator would
feel from his constituents could force him to concede to the views of
the majority.
The modern approach to Establishment Clause controversies is
generally recognized as that formulated in Everson v. Board of Education.8 9 There, the Court upheld a New Jersey statute against an
Establishment Clause challenge. The statute provided that parents
would be reimbursed for money spent on public bus transportation
of their children to both public and private (mostly parochial)
schools. The Court found the legislation to have a secular rather
than a religious purpose,' 0 and, therefore, was not an infringement
upon the Establishment Clause. The Court drew an analogy between providing public transportation to parochial schoolchildren
and providing police, fire, and disposal services to religious institutions. These services are provided to public and private institutions
alike and are separate from their religious function."' The Court interpreted the first amendment as requiring the state to be neutral in
its relations with religious groups, noting that "state power is no
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. at 3345.
Id.
Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. at 351 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 3352.
Id. at 3351.
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Id. at 7.
Id. at 18.
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more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor
' Thus,
them." 42
the first prong of the developing test applicable to
Establishment Clause cases was formulated.
In 1968, the Court developed the second prong of the test when,
in Board of Education v. Allen,4 3 they found a statute authorizing
the loaning of public textbooks to all students not violative of the
Establishment Clause."" The Court determined that the aid that parochial schools received under this program was an indirect, rather
than a primary, effect of the statute. Thus, the Court held that a
statute, the primary effect of which "neither advances nor inhibits
religion," may be upheld under the Establishment Clause.4
The Court added the third part of the test in Walz v. Tax Commission.4 There, the Court upheld statutes granting property tax
exemptions to religious institutions for property used only for religious worship. The Court recognized the problems that the imposition of property taxes on religious institutions could create between
government and religious bodies. The decision reflects the belief that
exemption from property taxes constitutes an attempt to guard
against the dangers of excessive government entanglement inherent
in an attempt to evaluate property for taxation purposes and to collect taxes due and owing from religious organizations.4 However,
the Court acknowledged that any evaluation of excessive government
entanglement is necessarily one of degree.48
During the time that this three-prong test was developing, the
Court handed down a number of decisions concerning the Establishment Clause. In Zorach v. Clauson,4" the Court upheld a New York
released time statute allowing for the dismissal of students from public schools to attend religi6us instruction elsewhere. 50 The Court
found nothing in the Constitution requiring the government to take a
42. Id.
43. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
44. Id. at 238.
45. Id. at 243 (quoting Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222
(1963)).
46. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
47. Id. at 673.
48. Id. at 674. The questions a court must ask and answer in an entanglement inquiry
are first, "whether the involvement is excessive"; and second, whether the involvement is a
continuing one calling for constant official surveillance. Id. at 675.
49. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
50. Id. at 315. The Court noted in its decision that the program "involves neither religious instruction in public school classrooms nor the expenditure of public funds." Id. at 30809.
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hostile attitude toward religion."' Rather, because "[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being . . .
[w]hen the State encourages religious instruction or cooperates with
religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions." 2
A few years prior, the Court had invalidated a similar released
time statute." The Court distinguished its earlier decision on the
grounds that in that case the public school classrooms were used for
religious instruction and the public school system was used to promote the instruction. 4 The Court found the mere accommodation by
the public schools in Zorach to be within the boundaries of the Es55
tablishment Clause.
In Engel v. Vitale," the Court struck down the practice of daily
classroom invocation of prayer as prescribed by the State's Board of
Regents.5" The Court found that the practice of prayer in public
schools was completely inconsistent with the Establishment Clause,
even though there was no element of coercion involved and the student could be excused from the exercise at his or her parents' request. The Court found the nature of the prayer to be unequivocably
religious,58 and as such, violative of the standard set down in Everson v. Board of Education." It made no difference to the Court that
the prayer did not amount to a total establishment of one particular
religious group to the exclusion of all others; the Establishment

Clause was still violated.60
One year later, the Court again considered and rejected state
statutes prescribing that schools begin each day with the recitation of
the Lord's Prayer and readings from the Bible." The facts in this
case were slightly different as the prayers were not officially composed by a state agency. Nevertheless, the Court held that statutes
requiring the recitation of prayers in unison by students in the pub51. Id. at 314.
52. Id. at 313-14.
53. McCollum v. Board of Educ. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
54. 343 U.S. at 315.
55. Id.
56. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
57. Id. at 424. The prayer that was required to be recited daily inpublic schools was as
follows: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers, and our Country." Id. at 422.
58. Id. at 424-25.
59. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
60. 370 U.S. at 436.
61. Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). A companion case, Murray
v. Curlett, was decided contemporaneously.
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lic schools were in violation of the Establishment Clause provisions.6 The fact that the practice may have been a minor encroachment on the Establishment Clause did not excuse it. The Court was
concerned that "[t]he breach of neutrality that is today a trickling
stream may all too soon become a raging torrent." 6 3
The three prongs of the Establishment Clause test were consolidated in the Court's holding in Lemon v. Kurtzman.6"' The case involved salary supplements paid out of public funds to lay teachers in
parochial schools. The teachers were required to teach only secular
subjects and to use only materials that were used in public schools.
The Court invalidated the statutes and, in the process, fused the
three tests that had evolved from previous Establishment Clause
cases 6 into a single three-prong test. The resultant test was formulated as follows: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . [and] finally, the statute

must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. '"66 This test has been used from its inception to weigh various
statutes against the requirements of the Establishment Clause. "
Justice Brennan noted in his dissent that the opinion was carefully drafted and decided on narrow grounds.6 8 The practice of legislative prayer that has continued for 200 years is now sanctioned by
the Supreme Court as outside the limitations of the Establishment
Clause. Although the status quo will remain, this opinion opens up
new ground for states with regard to the religious practices by official governmental bodies.
Instead of using existing precedent to decide the case on its
facts, the Court in Marsh v. Chambers chose to ignore the Establishment Clause test which it had slowly and painstakingly developed
over almost a quarter of a century's challenges. The majority opinion, while citing very little case authority, based its analysis on the
62. Id. at 223.
63. Id. at 225.
64. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The Court consolidated for decision two other cases involving
the same issues, Earley v. DiCenso and Robinson v. DiCenso.
65. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S.
236 (1968); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
66. 403 U.S. at 612-13.
67. See e.g. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Committee for Public Educ. and
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773, 813 (1973); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39
(1980); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
68. Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. at 3337. Justice Brennan points out that the historical and traditional arguments used to support the majority's position are ones of "limited rationale" and thus "should pose little threat to the overall fate of the Establishment Clause." Id.
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tradition of legislative prayer in this country and the history of the
drafting of the first amendment to the Constitution. One of the few
citations in the majority opinion was to an 1888 Supreme Court case
that discussed the weight to be given to historical evidence and the
framers' intent with respect to the scope of the Establishment
Clause." It seems quite clear that if the three-prong test had been
used to measure the Nebraska Legislature's religious activity, the
Court would have had to enjoin the practice of legislative prayer as
violative of the Establishment Clause."0
The fact that the opinion does not follow existing precedent
weakens its persuasiveness because no sound support exists for the
position the Court has taken. Apparently, the justices decided how
they were going to rule and then searched for case law to support
their chosen position. Unfortunately, no such case law existed, and
the majority was forced to come up with a viable alternative argument. The alternative presented in the majority opinion is weak at
best and minimally useful as precedent.
The historical argument relied upon by the majority to justify
continuing the practice of legislative prayer has three major flaws.
First, the assumption that the framers never intended the Establishment Clause to prohibit legislative prayer is questionable. As Justice
Brennan pointed out in his dissent, the framers, in their role as legislators, may have overlooked the constitutional ramifications of a congressional chaplain's appointment.7 Second, the historical argument
emphasizes Congress's intent, rather than that of the States, in interpreting the Bill of Rights. This is a significant oversight due to the
fact that the Bill of Rights was imposed upon Congress by the states
as a condition of ratification of the Constitution. 2 Finally, due to the
very nature of the Constitution, an historical argument is an inappropriate basis for upholding a constitutional challenge. The Constitution is not a static document; interpretations of its message change
with the evolution of American society.7 ' Although the framers of
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights probably never envisioned
just how diverse American society would become, it is almost certain
69. Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. at 3334 (quoting Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance
Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888) for the proposition that an act "passed by the first Congress assembled under the Constitution . . . is contemporaneous and weighty evidence of its true
meaning.").
70. Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. at 3338-39. In his dissent, Justice Brennan pointed
out the encroachments on each prong of the test.
71. Id. at 3347.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 3348.
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that they expected the Constitution to adapt to any diversity that
might evolve.
At its worst, the Court's analysis could lead to dangerous intrusions on rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights as well as those
emanating from the Constitution itself. For example, now that the
Court has upheld the invocation of prayer when practiced by adults
in state legislatures, state education authorities may be able to instigate some sort of prayer activity in the state colleges and universities.
The students at these institutions are presumably mature enough to
be able to realize and appreciate the differences among the various
religious beliefs; therefore, the offering of prayer before classes will
not likely lead to the establishment of a state religion. Even high
school students may be considered mature enough to be uninfluenced
by the recitation of prayers in homeroom-or so the argument goes.
The historical and traditional arguments espoused by the Court
in the majority opinion may be applied to other areas just as unconvincingly. If the United States had a history of cutting off the hands
of convicted thieves, this long-standing tradition might be enough to
override the provision in the Bill of Rights dealing with cruel and
unusual punishment. Similar rights, such as the right to be free from
enslavement and a woman's right to have an abortion, may be similarly threatened by this approach to judicial decision-making. The
possibilities are remote, but they do exist.
Overall, the Court's decision upholding the Nebraska Legislature's practice of daily prayer should pose little threat to the values
protected by the Establishment Clause. Although technically a clear
violation of the three-prong test the Court developed to evaluate Establishment Clause cases, the continuation of legislative prayer is in
reality a de minimus encroachment on the doctrine of church-state
separation. The insignificant impact of the Court's decision should
not belie the fact that the historical and traditional arguments which
the majority uses to support its position invites further violations of
constitutional protections. Rights recently gained by segments of society could be curtailed if a narrow historical analysis is strictly followed in constitutional questions. The Court must take care that any
reliance on history and tradition is coupled with the use of sound
precedent, lest the Constitution indeed becomes a static document,
ineffective as a guarantee of basic human rights in today's society.
Wendy Linn Ross

